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THE NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH ACT: AN
UNFULFILLED MANDATE
For the past thirty years, the National School Lunch Act (Act),
has attempted to advance two objectives; the preservation of the
health and well-being of the nation's youth and the encouragement
of domestic' consumption of agricultural commodities.' The Act, a
descendant of earlier depression-era government programs,3 pro-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-66 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Actl.
In 1946 Congress passed the National School Lunch Act, ch. 281, 60 Stat. 230 (1946). The
Act has been amended significantly several times. In 1962, a major amendment to the Act
was passed by Congress to make the program more effective. Act of Oct. 15, 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-823, 99 1-6, 76 Stat. 944. A program of special cash assistance payments was author-
ized under section eleven of the Act. Pub. L. No. 87-823, § 6, 76 Stat. 946 (1962). While the
program was first authorized in 1962, it was not funded until 1966 when a two million dollars
appropriation was made. S. REP. No. 259, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1975). [hereinafter
cited as S. REP. No. 259].
In 1968, the Act was amended to provide a special food service program for children in
nonresidential child-care institutions. Act of May 8, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-302, § 3, 82 Stat.
117. The entire program was initially funded for the fiscal year 1969 at $8.75 million. S. REP.
No. 259, at 13. The funding was increased to $117 million for the fiscal year 1975. Id.
In 1970, Congress significantly amended the Act. Act of May 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-248,
§§ 1, 3-4, 6-9, 84 Stat. 207. The amended statute established a federal minimum family-
size income standard for determining a child's eligibility which replaced varying local stan-
dards. Id. § 6. The amendments also established a twenty cent "ceiling" on the price of
reduced lunches, and they prohibited overt identification of National School Lunch Program
(NSLP) recipients. Id.
Congress also inserted "poverty priority" language into section nine of the Act which read
as follows:
In providing meals free or at reduced cost to needy children, first priority shall be given
to providing free meals to the neediest children.
Id. § 9. To insure that the mandate would be effective, the 1970 amendments required
each state, as a prerequisite to the receipt of federal funds, to submit to the United States
Department of Agriculture a state plan for the following school year delineating intended
program operations. Id.
In 1970, Congress also expressly authorized the Department of Agriculture to promulgate
regulations governing the NSLP. Id. § 8. The Department of Agriculture's regulations at-
tempted to clarify the requirements of the NSLP. See 35 Fed. Reg. 753 (1970) (formerly 7
C.F.R. §§ 210.1-.20); id. at 14065 (formerly 7 C.F.R. §§ 245.1-.12).
For a detailed discussion of the NSLP, see Comment, The National School Lunch Program,
1970: Mandate to Feed the Children, 60 GEO. L.J. 711 (1972).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1751 (1970).
3. Under the Agricultural Appropriation Act of 1935, 7 U.S.C. § 612c (1970), 30 percent
of gross customs receipts may be used by the Secretary of Agriculture to promote the domestic
consumption of farm products. The school-lunch program was a part of this program. Similar
distribution programs were undertaken by the Works Progress Administration and the Na-
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vides for aid to "state educational agencies"4 that elect to partici-
pate in the National School Lunch Program (NSLP).
Participation in the NSLP is purely voluntary.' In order to partic-
ipate, states through their educational agencies must enter into
written agreements with the Department of Agriculture and agree
to administer the lunch program in accordance with the Act.'
Additionally, states wishing to. participate must be willing to pro-
vide basic facilities, either statewide or locally, and to underwrite a
substantial portion of the program's costs.7
The NSLP requires that the state educational agency which de-
termines the eligibility of schools' for participation in the NSLP
consider need and attendance.' Before funds can be distributed to
schools, an agreement must be executed between the educational
agency and the local school authority."0 The Secretary of Agriculture
must approve this agreement."
Section 1758 of Title 42 of the United States Code, which is the
nutritional and program requirement provision, authorizes the Sec-
retary of Agriculture to prescribe income poverty guidelines each
tional Youth Administration during the depression years. Comment, The National School
Lunch Program, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 372 n.3 (1970).
4. The Act defines the term "state educational agency" as either "(A) the chief State
school officer. . . or (B) a board of education controlling the State department of education."
42 U.S.C. § 1760(d)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974).
5. See Shaw v. Governing Bd., 310 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1970) (the court held that
participation in the NSLP is purely voluntary and any school district which feels it cannot
afford to meet the requirements of the program is entitled to drop out).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1756 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974); 7 C.F.R. § 210.3(c) (1975).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1756 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974); 7 C.F.R. §§ 210.3(c), 210.6
(1975). The program was designed to encourage the states to assume a greater burden of the
cost as time progressed. For each dollar of federal money distributed to a state between the
years 1947 and 1951, that state was required to match it with one dollar of its own funds.
From 1951 to 1955, the state had to provide one-and-a half dollars for each federal dollar.
Now, a state must provide three dollars for every federal dollar disbursed to it. It should be
noted, however, that this formula is not so rigid where the per capita income of the state is
less than that of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1756 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
8. The Act defines the term "school" as "any public or nonprofit private school of high
school grade or under .... " 42 U.S.C. § 1760(d)(7) (Supp. IV, 1974).
The regulations define "school" as "an educational unit of high school grade or under
operating under public or nonprofit private ownership in a single building or complex of
buildings .... " 7 C.F.R. § 210.2(o) (1975).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1757 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
10. Id.; 7 C.F.R. § 210.8(a) (1975).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1757 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974); 7 C.F.R. § 210.4a(a) (1975).
[Vol. IV
1976] NOTES
fiscal year in order to establish a national standard of eligibility for
free lunches.'2 Section 1758 mandates that:'3
Any child who is a member of a household which has an annual income not
above the applicable family-size income level set forth in the income poverty
guidelines . . . shall be served a free lunch.
The provisions of sections 1758, however, are couched in terms of
"[1lunches served by schools participating in the school-lunch pro-
gram."' 4 Whether the mandate of section 1758 applies to individual
participating schools or entire school districts with at least one par-
ticipating school has been the issue of frequent litigation.'5 The
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1758(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). If a child's household has an income not above
the applicable family-size level, as prescribed by the guidelines, the child is eligible for a free
lunch. 42 U.S.C. § 1758(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
Prior to the 1970 amendments, the minimum eligibility standards for the receipt of free or
reduced price lunches was left to the discretion of each local school authority. Therefore, it
was possible for the same child to meet the eligibility requirements of one school but not
another's. See National School Lunch Act, ch. 281, § 9, 60 Stat. 233 (1946). The Department
of Agriculture published a set of recommended guidelines in October, 1968, but these were
not mandatory. See 33 Fed. Reg. 15,674-76 (1968).
Effective January 1, 1976, the Secretary is required to issue, not later than June 1 of each
fiscal year, revised income poverty guidelines. The revised guidelines are to be used during
the subsequent twelve month period from July through June. The 1975 amendments permit
a state educational agency to fix its income poverty guidelines 25 percent above the applicable
family-size income level prescribed by the Secretary in determining a child's eligibility for a
free lunch. For reduced price lunches, a state educational agency can fix its eligibility guide-
lines 95 percent above the Secretary's guidelines. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1758 (Supp. 1976).
The Federal Income Poverty Guidelines, as prescribed by the Secretary, which apply to 48
states, excluding Alaska and Hawaii, are set out in Table I:
TABLE I
25% Above 95% Above
Family-Size 1976 Guideline Guideline Guideline
3 $4,200 $5,250 $ 8,200
4 $5,010 $6,260 $ 9,770
5 $5,750 $7,190 $11,210
6 $6,490 $8,110 $12,650
Interview with Les Powell, Food Program Specialist, United States Depertment of Agricul-
ture, in Washington, D.C., March 24, 1976.
The State of New York has elected to set its guidelines 25 percent above the Secretary's
guidelines for free lunches, and 95 percent above for reduced price lunches.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1758(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
14. Id. § 1758(a).
15. See, e.g., Justice v. Board of Educ., 351 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Jones v. Board
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denial of free lunches to a student based on the school he attends
has also been challenged as an arbitrary classification of students
in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 1
Case law 7 prior to the enactment of the 1970 amendments" ad-
hered to the view that "schools participating in the school-lunch
program" included only individual "attendance units,'' 9 rather
than the school district as a whole participating in the NSLP. Under
this view, eligible children at a participating school would receive
free or reduced priced lunches, while eligible children at a non-
participating school within the same district would not.
The leading case adhering to this view is Briggs v. Kerrigan." The
complaint in Briggs alleged that in Boston the NSLP was confined
to those schools, generally in the more affluent communities, which
contained facilities "adequate" to accommodate the program.',
Plaintiffs, potential beneficiaries of the NSLP, contended that the
Boston program was administered in violation both of the Act and
of their fifth and fourteenth amendment rights since discrimination
on the basis of "adequate" facilities was arbitrary and not rationally
related to the purposes of the Act.22
Relying upon the statutory language of the Act and its 1946 legis-
lative history, the court concluded:
of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Ohio 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 1232 (6th
Cir. 1973); Ayala v. District 60 School Bd., 327 F. Supp. 980 (D. Colo. 1971).
16. See, e.g., Richmond Welfare Rights Organization v. Snodgrass, No. 73-2778 (9th Cir.,
Oct. 15, 1975); Davis v. Robinson, 346 F. Supp. 847 (D.R.I. 1972); Briggs v. Kerrigan, 307 F.
Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 967 (1st Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
17. Ayala v. District 60 School Bd., 327 F. Supp. 980 (D. Colo. 1971); Briggs v. Kerrigan,
307 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 967 (1st Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
18. Act of May 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-248, §§ 1, 3-4, 6-9, 84 Stat. 207.
19. See, e.g., Briggs v. Kerrigan, 307 F. Supp. 295, 301 (D. Mass. 1969), aff 'd, 431 F.2d
967 (1st Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
20. 307 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 967 (1st Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
21. 307 F. Supp. at 299. Of the 51 schools which offered lunch programs, only 39 had
"adequate" facilities to prepare lunches on their own premises. These schools contained
kitchens with refrigerators, cooking facilities, storage areas, and cafeterias. The remaining
twelve schools had lunches trucked in from nearby schools with facilities. However, none of
the twelve schools had cafeterias. Id.
22. 307 F. Supp. at 299. The Supreme Court established a standard for classifications
which demanded that they be neither arbitrary nor creative of an invidious discrimination
when judged in light of the objectives of the legislation. See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305
(1966); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
23. 307 F. Supp. at 301.
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[Tihat neither the purpose nor the language of the statute, as construed in
the light of its legislative history, supports the plaintiffs' contention that
there is an express or implied statutory requirement that lunches be made
available to schools and students according to economic need.
Although the Act required state educational agencies to determine
eligibility for participation based on need and attendance, the court
reasoned that the Act did not require these agencies to select areas
of economic need before other areas. 4 Briggs concluded that "[a]
priority of such significance would not be couched in such ambigu-
ous terms,"25 but rather it would be clearly expressed as in section
four of the Child Nutrition Act. 6
The Briggs court also stated that section 1758 should be construed
to apply only to individual "attendance units" which are participat-
ing in the NSLP.27 It reasoned that the "plain language of the sec-
tion" only refers to "schools participating in the school-lunch
program" and therefore it should not be construed as applying to
the entire school district. 8 The Boston school system fulfilled the
1758 mandate by providing lunches to all eligible children at those
individual schools which participated."2
In concluding that Boston's NSLP did not violate the plaintiff's
constitutional rights, the court explained that the ineligibility
which resulted from the classification was unfortunate, but that
the classification was neither arbitrary nor an invidious discrimi-
nation since it was not wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the
24. Id. The Act did not contain "poverty priority" language prior to the 1970 amend-
ments. See National School Lunch Act, ch. 281, § 9, 60 Stat. 233 (1946).
25. 307 F. Supp. at 301.
26. Id. The Briggs court was referring to the following statutory language:
In selecting schools [for participation], the State educational agency shall, to the
extent practicable, give first consideration to those schools drawing attendance from
areas in which poor economic conditions exist ....
Act of Oct. 11, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-642, § 4, 80 Stat. 886. See also Child Nutrition Act, Pub.
L. No. 94-105, §§ 2-3, 14-18, 23, 89 Stat. 511 (1975).
The Child Nutrition Act of 1966 was enacted by Congress to provide cash assistance to help
schools in low-income areas acquire food service equipment, and to establish, maintain, or
expand food service programs. Act of Oct. 11, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-642, § 5, 80 Stat. 887.
The Child Nutrition Act of 1966 also established a school breakfast program, and a special
milk program to encourage the consumption of fluid milk by children. Id. §§ 3-4. See also S.
REP. No. 259, at 11-12.
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state's purpose."' Additionally, the decision not to undertake imme-
diate capital expenditures to build kitchen facilities was "not so
unreasonable as to reach constitutional dimensions. ''31
In 1970, Congress significantly amended the Act.:2 The 1970
amendments established a national standard of eligibility for free
lunches,33 gave first priority to the neediest children34 and author-
ized the Department of Agriculture to promulgate regulations which
would govern the NSLP.35 Relying on the 1970 amendments, several
cases36 have held that the NSLP required school districts with a
participating school to provide free or reduced price lunches to all
of their eligible children, whether or not they attended a participat-
ing school. 7 The decisions in these cases were based primarily upon
three considerations: the new statutory language; the 1970 legisla-
tive history; and the Department of Agriculture's regulations.
The Briggs decision may be contrasted with that of Davis v.
Robinson." Plaintiffs in Davis brought a civil rights action against
30. Id. at 302. The Briggs court cited the following passage from McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), to support its holding:
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are
presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in
practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be
set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
307 F. Supp. at 302, quoting McGowan v. Maryland, supra at 425-26; see note 22 supra.
31. 307 F. Supp. at 303.
32. Act of May 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-248, §§ 1, 3-4, 6-9, 84 Stat. 207.
33. Id. § 6.
34. Id.
35. Id. § 8.
36. Justice v. Board of Educ., 351 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Jones v. Board of Educ.,
348 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Ohio 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 1232 (6th Cir. 1973);
Davis v. Robinson, 346 F. Supp. 847 (D.R.I. 1972).
37. See, e.g., Justice v. Board of Educ., 351 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). In Justice
the primary issue was to what extent may needy children be excluded from a lunch program
administered by a school or other local unit. The defendant, the Board of Education of Mount
Vernon, New York, maintained a school-lunch program in only four of its fourteen schools.
The four schools were selected because they had cafeterias or other lunch program facilities.
Under the defendant's lunch program, schools with relatively few needy children had a lunch
program, while schools with a 90 percent concentration of poor children did not. Id. at 1255.
The Justice court held, relying upon the 1970 amendments and its congressional history, that
the limitation of the NSLP to four schools, selected on the basis of facilities rather than
concentration of poor children, violates the provisions of the Act. Id. at 1257.
38. 346 F. Supp. 847 (D.R.I. 1972).
NOTES
state officials on behalf of impoverished school children who were
not receiving free or reduced price lunches. Plaintiffs contended
that the refusal of state officials to expand the NSLP to needy
schools on the basis of inadequate facilities violated the provisions
of the Act and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The state officials, relying on Briggs, claimed that the lack
of adequate facilities at certain schools was sufficient justification
for not expanding the NSLP to those schools.3"
Section 1758, at the time of the Davis decision, contained "pov-
erty priority" language which mandated that the neediest children
be provided for first.4 The Davis court was required to decide
whether this mandate was directed to the voluntary participating
school, the school district with one or more participating schools, or
state officials.4 The Davis court concluded that the mandate was
directed to the school district as a whole.4"
The Davis court noted that the Department of Agriculture regula-
tions substituted the phrase "school food authority" for the term
"school" wherever reference was made to local NSLP obligations in
the Act.43 The regulations define the phrase "school food authority"
as
44
the governing body which is responsible for the administration of one or more
schools and which has the legal authority to operate a lunch program therein.
Read in the light of this definition, the term "school" as used in the
Act would not refer to the individual "attendance units" described
in Briggs, but to the entire school district.45 Since the Department
of Agriculture was authorized by the Act to promulgate regulations
which would govern the NSLP, the Davis court found the adminis-
trative interpretation persuasive. 4
39. Id. at 848-49.
40. Act of May 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-248, § 6, 84 Stat. 210 (1970); see note 1 supra.
41. 346 F. Supp. at 855.
42. Id. at 857.
43. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 210.2, 245.10 (1975). At the time of the Davis decision, the regulations
contained the following language: "Each school food authority shall serve lunches free or at
a reduced price to all children whom it determines ...are unable to pay the full price of
the lunch." 35 Fed. Reg. 14066 (1970).
44. 7 C.F.R. § 210.2(p) (1975).
45. Id.; see Briggs v. Kerrigan, 307 F. Supp. 295, 301 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 967
(Ist Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
46. 346 F. Supp. at 856. See also Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192-94 (1969).
1976]
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Section 1758 does not contain any phrase similar to the Depart-
ment of Agriculture phrase "school food authority." The Senate
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry decided not to incorporate
analogous terminology because it thought that the local contracting
agent had always been the school district. 7 The committee also
feared that the insertion of similar terminology in the Act might
result in the extension of the NSLP beyond secondary and primary
schools to junior colleges or other educational institutions adminis-
tered by the local contracting agent.4" The issue of whether the term
"school" encompasses school districts as a whole rather than indi-
vidual participating schools, turns on whether the Department of
Agriculture's regulations are to be followed.
Relying upon the congressional committee reports and debates,
the Davis court stated:4"
The legislative history of the 1970 Amendments evidences a clear Congres-
sional intent that "any child at poverty level must receive a free or reduced
price lunch and priority . . . must be given to neediest children."
The Davis court reasoned that the purpose of the 1970 amendments
was "to combat hunger in the classroom and malnutrition," and to
achieve this goal by requiring school districts to provide for their
neediest children first.5"
47. S. REP. No. 641, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 6411;
see Comment, supra note 1, at 721 nn.55 & 56. In rejecting Senator McGovern's proposal to
substitute the phrase "local educational agency" (school district) for the Act's term "school,"
the committee gave the following reason:
Senator McGovern's objective in substituting "local educational agency" for "school"
is to "put an end to the State and local option of having individual schools rather than
school districts to be contracting agencies .... "
The amendment would not accomplish its objective in this respect. The Department
of Agriculture advises that the school district is already the contracting agency in every
case ....
S. REP. No. 641, at 3.
48. S. REP. No. 641, at 4; see Comment, supra note 1, at 722 n.57.
49. 346 F. Supp. at 857, quoting Senator Javits, 116 CONO. REc. 13607 (1970).
50. 346 F. Supp. at 857. The vital language of section 1758 which the Davis court relies
on is as follows:
[Any child who is a member of a household which has an annual income not above
the applicable family-size income level set forth in the income poverty guidelines shall
be served meals free or at a reduced cost. . . . In providing meals free or at reduced
cost to needy children, first priority shall be given to providing free meals to the
neediest children.
42 U.S.C. § 1758 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1758(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
[Vol. IV
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In light of the 1970 legislative history of the Act, the Davis court
concluded that it was not reasonable to read the Act as allowing
"school boards to install national school lunch programs in the
wealthier schools under their jurisdiction but not in the poorer
schools."'" Davis also observed that leaving discretion to participate
in the NSLP to the individual school would not necessarily result
in the extension of benefits to the neediest children first.52 There-
fore, the Davis court concluded that the Department of Agriculture
was correct in interpreting section 1758 as applying to school dis-
tricts as a whole." Having disposed of the claim on these grounds,
the court was not required to decide the constitutional aspects of the
problem .
Recently, the Ninth Circuit in Richmond Welfare Rights Organi-
zation v. Snodgrass55 held that section 1758 required that only indi-
vidual "participating schools" provide free or reduced price lunches
to their eligible children.56 Thus, the Ninth Circuit is the first court,
since the 1970 amendments, to adhere to the Briggs view of the
NSLP requirements.
Plaintiff in Snodgrass alleged that the Richmond Unified School
District had violated the provisions of section 1758 by incorporating
less than all of its schools into the NSLP.5 7 The defendant district
In referring to the 1970 amendments of section 1758, Senator Javits stated that the new
statutory language "makes the intent of the Congress crystal clear that poor children can no
longer be denied free or reduced cost lunches." 116 CONG. REc. 13607 (1970) (remarks of
Senator Javits).
51. 346 F. Supp. at 857.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 858.
54. The courts which grant relief under the Act, do not have to decide the constitutional
problems posed by their cases. When these courts, such as the Davis court, decided that there
were violations of a federal statute, namely the Act, they were justified in avoiding the
constitutional issues since relief has already been granted. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
(1968).
55. No. 75-2778 (9th Cir., Oct. 15, 1975).
56. Id. at 2. The plaintiff's also claimed that the defendant violated section 245.6(b) of
the regulations by denying free lunches to eligible children transferring from a participating
to a non-participating school within the same district. Id.; see 7 C.F.R. § 245.6(b) (1975). In
dismissing this claim, the court of appeals stated that the regulation applied only to partici-
pating schools. No. 73-2778, at 12.
57. No. 73-2778, at 2. The plaintiffs relied on the section 1758 mandate which basically
states that any child who qualifies under the income poverty guidelines shall be served a free
lunch. 42 U.S.C. § 1758(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). As the "poverty priority" language of section
1758(b) was removed in 1972, Act of Sept. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-433, § 5, 86 Stat. 726, the
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had for some years administered the NSLP in all of its twelve sec-
ondary schools but later expanded its lunch program to include only
six of its 49 elementary schools. These six schools had the highest
concentration of students qualifying under the income poverty
guidelines,5" but the defendant nevertheless served only one out of
every five of the eligible children in the school district.
In reversing the holding of the district court, the court of appeals
stated that the lower court committed fundamental error by failing
to distinguish between statutory provisions concerning participa-
tion in the NSLP, and those concerning eligibility.59 The court of
appeals concluded that the district court had quoted the following
language of section 1758 out of context:8
Any child who is a member of a household which has an annual income not
above the applicable family-size income . . shall be served a free lunch.
Relying upon this language, the district court contended that a
school district with one or more participating schools must serve free
lunches to all of its eligible children.' The court of appeals reasoned
that the section 1758 mandate is limited by the first sentence of the
section which begins with the phrase "[1]unches served by schools
participating in the school-lunch program." 2 Therefore, as the court
of appeals concluded, section 1758 does not require free or reduced
price lunches to be served to all eligible children within a school
court of appeals is not confronted with the same problem as the Davis court since a partici-
pant in'the NSLP is no longer required to provide for its neediest children first. See text
accompanying notes 49-52 supra.
58. See note 12 supra.
59. No. 73-2778, at 2. One month after the district court entered its decree, the defendant
district announced that it would withdraw from the NSLP the following year. The court of
appeals enjoined the termination of the defendant's lunch program until the district court
adjudicated the plaintiff's fourteenth amendment claims. Id. at 14-15. See also Shaw v.
Governing Bd., 310 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
60. No. 73-2778, at 7-8; see 42 U.S.C. § 1758(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
61. No. 73-2778, at 5.
62. Id. at 8; see 42 U.S.C. § 1758(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). The court of appeals supports its
statement by citing to the congressional debates. In the House, the following was asked:
Is there any requirement in this bill that if a State provides a school lunch program
for some children that it must also provide a school lunch program for all children?
115 CONG. REc. 7045 (1969) (remarks of Representative Griffiths). The answer was "[nlo."
Id. (remark of Representative Steiger).
In the Senate, it was asked if there was a requirement forcing schools to participate. The




district.63 In support of this conclusion, the court explained the 1970
Amendments as follows:6"
A careful reading of the history confirms that Congress recognized that the
1970 Amendments would not compel all schools to participate, despite an
abundance of broad statements to the effect that all needy children would
be fed.
This reasoning is consonant with Briggs' interpretation of the Act
in that it limits the section 1758 mandate to individual participating
schools.
The rationale of those cases which overrule Briggs v. Kerrigan5
has likewise been considerably weakened by the 1975 amendments
to the Act and the regulations. Section 1758 no longer contains the
"poverty priority" language which the Davis court cited as support-
ing its conclusion that individual schools alone could not provide for
the neediest children effectively. However, the legislative history
to the 1975 amendments contains statements similar to those relied
upon by the Davis court. Therefore, under the Davis rationale and
the 1975 amendments, it can be argued that the purpose of the Act
is "making sure that all American children receive basic foods at
lunchtime . '... ,,6
The amendments of the Department of Agriculture regulations,69
on the other hand, delete the phrase "[e]ach school food authority
shall serve lunches free or at a reduced price to all children," and
thus vitiate the Davis argument that the Department was correct
in interpreting section 1758 as applying to school districts as a
whole.70 Since the phrase "school food authority" is no longer used
in a context similar to the section 1758 mandate, the Department
of Agriculture may be interpreting the section 1758 mandate as
applying only to individual participating schools.
On the basis of the subsequent amendments to the Act7 and the
63. No. 73-2778, at 16.
64. Id. at 9.
65. 307 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1969).
66. See text accompanying notes 67-73 infra.
67. See 346 F. Supp. at 855.
68. 121 CONG. REC. 17697 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1975) (remarks of Senator Montoyo).
69. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 245.3(a) (1975).
70. Id.; see Davis v. Robinson, 346 F. Supp. 847, 857 (D.R.I. 1972).
71. See note 47 supra.
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regulations,72 the Ninth Circuit seems to be correct in limiting the
section 1758 mandate to individual participating schools alone. If
Congress intended to provide all eligible children within a school
district with a free lunch, it should have inserted the phrase "school
food authority" into the opening sentence of section 1758. Since the
term "school" is limited by the Act and the regulations": to high
school grades or under, the insertion of the phrase "school food
authority" would not necessarily result in the expansion of the
NSLP to junior colleges or other educational institutions within the
school district's jurisdiction.
The possibility of constitutional attack does, of course, remain,
but the chances of success are not encouraging in spite of the recent
decision of the court in Torres v. Butz.74 In Torres the court con-
cluded that the Child Nutrition Act breakfast program which pro-
vided free breakfasts to eligible children based on the "fortuitous
circumstance" of whether the child attended a participating school
was arbitrary and violative of the fourteenth amendment." The
NSLP cases are similar to the Torres case since both involve a
voluntary program where a participant is allowed to provide free
meals to its eligible children who attend a participating school
within the school district. If the NSLP does not provide free lunches
to all eligible children within a school district, the statute, under the
reasoning of the Torres case, arbitrarily classifies students in viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment. There is, however, serious ques-
tion as to whether the reasoning of Torres will be sustained on
appeal.
The Supreme Court's decision in Dandridge v. Williams"6 poses
serious problems for the constitutional argument that was success-
ful in Torres. The Court in Dandridge held that a Maryland regula-
tion which put a maximum limitation on the monthly grant which
a family could receive under the Aid to Families with Dependant
Children Program (AFDC) did not contravene either the Social Se-
curity Act or the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
72. See 7 C.F.R. § 245.3(a) (1975).
73. See note 8 supra.
74. 397 F. Supp. 1015 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
75. Id. at 1025 (dictum).
76. 397 U.S. 471 (1970); see Comment, The National School Lunch Act and the 1970
Amendments: Renaissance or Rhetoric?, 17 WAYNE L. REv. 955, 987-93 (1971).
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ment.77 Under the regulation, a "ceiling" of $250 per month was
imposed on AFDC grants regardless of the size of the family and its
needs." The Supreme Court concluded that the regulation did not
violate the statute.79
In upholding the regulation on constitutional grounds, the Su-
preme Court stated:' "
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are
imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend
the Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with mathe-
matical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality."
The Court also stated that the Constitution did not give it the power
to "second-guess state officials charged with the difficult
responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the
myriad of potential recipients.""1 Based upon these considerations,
the Court concluded that Maryland's decision to support all of its
eligible families, although some less adequately than others, was
reasonable in view of the state's limited resources.8 2
The NSLP cases 3 are dissimilar to Dandridge since needy chil-
dren are denied all benefits, whereas in Dandridge all eligible fami-
lies received benefits to some extent. There are cases 4 which have
77. 397 U.S. at 487.
78. Id. at 474.
79. Id. at 480-82.
80. Id. at 485, quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). The
plaintiffs in Snodgrass claim that the defendant district violated the equal protection clause
by operating its lunch program on a discriminatory basis. No. 73-2778, at 3. The defendant
maintained lunch programs in its segregated schools but not in its desegregated schools. Id.
If the district court finds that there is racial discrimination in the defendant's lunch program,
it will have to subject the defendant's classifications to the strictest judicial scrutiny. Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1967). Classifications based on race, religion, and national
origin demand a compelling interest in order to be constitutional. Id.
81. 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Richmond Welfare Rights Organization v. Snodgrass, No. 73-2778, (9th Cir.,
Oct. 15, 1975); Justice v. Board of Educ., 351 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Davis v.
Robinson, 346 F. Supp. 847 (D.R.I. 1972).
84. See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) where the Supreme Court held that
a Social Security classification which denied disability benefits only to dependent illegiti-
mates born after the onset of their parent's disability was not rationally related to the govern-
mental interest of preventing spurious claims. Id. at 637. This classification permitted illegiti-
mates to receive disability benefits without any showing of dependency if: (1) state law
permitted them to inherit from their wage-earner parent; (2) their illegitimacy resulted solely
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held that classifications denying benefits to a needy group are "un-
derinclusive," and thus violate the needy group's fourteenth amend-
ment rights. Despite the differences between Dandridge and these
cases, it seems that NSLPs which have a "reasonable basis" will not
be declared unconstitutional under the Dandridge rationale. As the
Supreme Court stated in Dandridge, "the Equal Protection Clause
does not require that a State must choose between attacking every
aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.""5 Given the
doubtful success of a constitutional attack, it would appear the
Act's general mandate that every eligible child shall receive a free
lunch can only be effectuated if Congress decides to amend the
statute by inserting the phrase "school food authority" into section
1758.
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from a formal, nonobvious defect in their parents' ceremonial marriage; or (3) they were
legitimated in accordance with state law. Id. at 631 n.2. Otherwise, illegitimates who did not
meet the foregoing conditions could only qualify for benefits only if their wage-earner parent
contributed to their support, or lived with them prior to the disability.
In the Jimenez opinion, Dandridge was not controlling since the classification of illegiti-
mates was not necessitated by an "allocation of finite resources." Id. at 634. Therefore, a
denial of all benefits to afterborn illegitimates was a denial of equal protection to these
children. Thus, the subclass in Jimenez was unconstitutional because it was "under-
inclusive." Id. at 637.
Similarly, it can also be argued that Dandridge should not control when applied to the
NSLP. The provisions of section 1758 permit a state educational agency to fix its income
guidelines 25 percent above the applicable family-size income level prescribed by the Secre-
tary of Agriculture in the income poverty guidelines, and 95 percent above the same standard
for reduced-price lunches. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1758(b) (Supp. 1976). If a state educational agency
permits a school district to provide free lunches to children from households which have an
income 25 percent above the applicable family-size poverty level, then the denial of free
lunches to children at poverty level would appear to be arbitrary and irrational under
Jimenez. The allocation of a school district's NSLP resources might not be considered reason-
able if it results in a denial of benefits to more needy eligible children while providing lunches
to others. Thus, the income guidelines are arguably "underinclusive" because unlike Dand-
ridge where all families received some aid, children from poor families might receive no free
lunch support. See also Rhodes v. Weinberger, 388 F. Supp. 437 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Burrell v.
Norton, 381 F. Supp. 339 (D. Conn. 1974); Norton v. Richardson, 52 F. Supp. 596 (D. Md.
1972), vacated, 418 U.S. 902 (1974) (mem.). But cf. Stanton v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 315 (10th
Cir. 1974).
85. 397 U.S. at 486-87, citing Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911);
see Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
